| KRATKA VSEBINA | Rezultati empiričnih analiz kažejo, da prevzemi zmanjšujejo konkurenco in vplivajo na višje cene. Po drugi strani pa imajo koristi proizvajalci, saj se po prevzemu poveča učinkovitost na račun zmanjšanja stroškov v proizvodnji in distribuciji. Ekonomska politika, ki želi vplivati na prevzeme, se torej sooča s vprašanjem, ali koristi od večje (stroškovne) učinkovitosti (oziroma koristi od racionalizacije) odtehtajo stroške povečane tržne moči (oziroma stroške manjše konkurence). Članek prikazuje pogoje, kjer lahko (horizontalni, vertikalni in konglomeratni) prevzemi povečajo ceno in/ali zmanjšajo stroške ter povečajo družbeno blaginjo, s pomočjo treh teoretičnih modelov:Williamsovega "Trade - off" modela, modela Farrella in Shapira ter modela Polaskia in Masona. // Empirical analysis show that mergers reduce industrycompetition and those result in higher prices for consumers. But on the other hand, mergers give rise to efficiency gains reducing the costs of production or distribution. One important question of economic policy therefore is whether there are particular circumstances under which cost efficiencies from merger (or advantages of rationalization) are most likelyto outweigh undesirable market power effects (or the losses from reduction in competition). In this article the general conditions under which mergers(horizontal, vertical and conglomerate) raise prices and/or reduce costs, and conditions for mergers to rise welfare are considered on the basis of three basic theoretical models: The Trade-off model of Williamson, the model of Farrell and Shapiro and the model of Polasky and Mason. It is shown that it is far from clear whether mergers generate net private returns which are positive, zero, or negative and whether they generate social returns that go beyond their private returns. |